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I. Introduction***
The 2008 global financial crisis spread to most of the developed
economies, including those of the European Union. Unfortunately, despite
decades of effort to build a Single Financial Market, almost all EU
jurisdictions lacked proper crisis resolution mechanisms, especially with
respect to the cross-border dimensions of a global crisis.' This led to a
threat of widespread bank failures in EU countries and near collapse of their
financial systems. Today, in the wake of the Eurozone financial crisis and
the recent Brexit vote, the EU is at a critical crossroads. It has to decide
whether the road to recovery runs through closer integration of financial
policies to follow recent centralization of bank supervision and resolution in
the European Banking Union (EBU) or whether to take the path of
fragmentation with a gradual return to controlled forms of protectionism in
the pursuit of narrow national interest, although the latter is bound to
endanger the single market. Therefore, the policy dilemmas facing the EU
and contemporary institution building within the Eurozone provide a key
window into the future of both global and regional financial integration.
The complexity of the financial integration process and its significance
means that it is impossible to understand contemporary developments within
the EU leading up to the EBU without a discussion of the different forms of
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integration and the history of financial integration in Europe. It is
important to draw a distinction between economic, monetary, and political
forms of integration before looking at the specific properties of EU financial
integration. Economic integration normally refers to integration of national
commercial and economic policies and elimination of trade barriers and
obstacles to foreign direct investment (FDI).2 Monetary integration refers
to formal currency alignments and interest rate cooperation between states
supported through a variety of institutional mechanisms.3 It could take a
stronger or a weaker form, depending on the nature of arrangements.4 The
stronger form refers to an unequivocal decision between more than one
jurisdiction to share a common currency and a single monetary and foreign
exchange policy, as a result of a bilateral or multilateral agreement between
interested states. It entails the establishment of a common central bank and
shared responsibility for joint monetary policymaking5 The weaker form of
monetary integration essentially refers to exchange rate alignments, like the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, or even adoption of another
country's currency policy by means of currency board arrangements. In
terms of sovereignty concessions the stronger form means abolition of the
2. For Ropke the free and reciprocal flow of trade between the various national economics is
what defines economic integration. See WILHELM ROPKE, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 72 (Gwen E. Trinks et al. trans. 1959) available at https://mises.org/
system/tdf/International%200rder%20and%20Economic%20Integration.pdf file=1&type=
document. Wilhelm Ropke was a "proponent of the Austrian School." Shawn Ritenour,
Biography of Wilhelm Ropke (1899-1966): Humane Economist, MISES INST. (Aug. 1, 2007), https://
mises.org/library/biography-wilhelm-r%C3`%B6pke-1899-1966-humane-economist. Thus, he
was suspicious of other forms of integration such as political integration and attendant
consolidation of political power. Id. He was one of the first economists to highlight "the
connection between culture and economic systems," and, uncharacteristically for an "Austrian,"
he "explored the ethical foundations of a market-based social order." Id. His ideas had
significant influence over West German post-war economic development. See id.
3. "Monetary arrangements that supplement trad[e] relationships have existed for centuries."
Ellen E. Meade, Monetary Integration, HARVARD INT'L REV. (Mar. 21, 2009), http://hir.harvard
.edu/rethinking-financemonetary-integration/. In the Eastern Roman Empire, "for example,
the solidus coin-a money whose metallic content was stable-circulated widely" for more than
seven hundred years. Id. Its predecessor, the denarius, was undermined by emperor
Diocletian's (284 - 305 AD) debasing of the metal content of the coin to cover the penury of
the Roman treasury at the time due to continuous defensive wars. See Martin A. Armstrong,
Diocletian - 284-305 AD, ARMSTRONG ECON., https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/
research/monetary-history-of-the-world/roman-empire/chronology_-by-emperor/tetrachy/di
ocletian-284-305-ad/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). "This type of monetary arrangement was not
a true monetary union but rather a common-currency-standard area, because ach country's
monetary policy was separately rooted in a commodity-such as gold or silver-and the union
did not establish a common monetary authority or currency." Meade, supra note 3. Thus, they
can hardly compare with the EMU. See id.
4. See generally Samuele Rosa, DEFINITION OF CURRENCY UNION, IMF COMM. ON
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS CURRENCY UNION TECH. EXPERT GROUPS (2004).
5. See also MAREK DABROWSKI, MONETARY UNION AND FISCAL AND MACROECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE 6 (2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/eedp/
pdf/dp013_en.pdf.
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national currency and of member states' ability to set interest rates. Yet
weaker forms like currency boards also entail-in exchange of currency and
economic credibility-loss of sovereignty over exchange rate setting and
inflation targeting since the currency board country essentially imports the
low or high inflation policies of the country of the reference currency.
On the other hand, financial sector integration refers to the elimination of
restrictions to cross-border capital flows that may involve transactions
concerning loans, debt, and equity securities, and of barriers to cross-border
market access and operation by financial intermediaries. It could extend to
rights of establishment for foreign firms. The market for a given set of
financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all potential market
participants with the same relevant characteristics deal with a single set of
rules, when they transact in financial instruments and/or provide financial
services within a certain geographic area or region. Moreover, firms and
consumers must have non-discriminatory access to such financial
instruments and/or services. Regulatory oversight arrangements within
integrated markets are non-discriminatory.6 Finally, political integration is
equally important. It involves the voluntary sharing/pooling of sovereignty,
whether in commercial and financial affairs, trade-policy cooperation/co-
ordination, or in relation to justice and national security.: Thus, given the
sovereignty concessions, integrated markets require a lack of political
integration that can hinder the flow of benefits emanating from monetary
and financial integration.
A central idea of this article is that the design of institutions underpinning
international financial integration has to be a step-by-step process. In the
EU market integration took several decades, starting with the European
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community
(EEC)s and from there to the EU and ultimately to the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the single currency.9
6. See LIEVEN BAELE, ANNALISA FERRANDO, PETER HORDAHL, ELIZAVETA KRYLOVA &
CYRIL MONNET, MEASURING FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE EURo AREA 7 (2004), available
at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocpl4.pdfab767d42e5483e5b763fa75031702
5ed4.
7. For the main tenets of political integration in an intergovernmentalist rational bargaining
framework, see generally Andrew Moravcski, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A
Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 473 (1993), https://
www.princeton.edu/-amoravcs/library/preferences1 .pdf.
8. The EU traces its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC). See Matthew J. Gabel, European Union (EU),
ENCYCLOPXDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (last
updated Oct. 17, 2016). The ECSC was established in 1951; it was a six-nation international
organization serving to abolish trade barriers in the areas covered by the treaty between the
democratic nations of Western Europe, as the Cold War had divided the geographic area
covered by European nations through the so-called "iron curtain." See id. The ECSC was the
first purely European organization in the postwar era to be based on the principles of supra-
nationalism. See id.
9. The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (EU) in 1993. See Gabel, supra
note 8. The same Treaty introduced the charter of the European Monetary Union. See id. The
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A key lesson EU financial integration offers is that problems inevitably
arise when a supra-national market exhibits a high degree of integration but
the development of cross-border regulatory mechanisms lags significantly
behind. This was the case in the Eurozone before the advent of the
European Banking Union (EBU). Namely, the end-point of any financial
integration process is the establishment of common institutions to deal with
financial sector supervision and crisis management. This, in turn, means the
pooling of sovereignty. The United Kingdom's decisions, first not to join
the euro and second to exit the EU, reflect the likely unwillingness of
nations to relinquish sovereignty to the extent necessary to achieve a fully
integrated financial system.
This article is in five parts. Following the present introduction, Part II
provides an analytical overview of economic and institutional developments
relating to the EU single market for financial services in the pre-crisis
period. Part III discusses the evolution of the EU Single Financial Market
and the causes of the Eurozone crisis. Part IV reviews the main tenets of the
European Banking Union and considers how this new set of EU institutions
will affect EU economic and political integration, particularly in light of
Brexit. It offers a critique of the process so far and discusses remaining gaps.
Part V concludes with a discussion of potential implications of EU
experiences for the future of international financial integration.
II. Building Blocks of the EU Single Financial Market
The EU constitutes the most advanced global laboratory for regional
economic, legal, and political integration.1o At the same time, the advent of
a banking crisis and a sovereign debt crisis-the two normally have a causal
relationship-provides a key ground to test again the fundamentals of
financial integration in the dual context of cost-benefit analysis and
institution building. The establishment of pan-European banks has, of
course, been the most potent integrative factor, in an environment marked,
at least in the earlier stages, by absence of regulatory cohesion. At the same
time, it was inevitable that the concurrent presence of pan-European banks
and of incoherent regulatory structures would lead to financial instability
across the single market and especially across the single currency area in the
event of serious market turbulence.
A. CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
The establishment of a single currency area (the Eurozone) and the pan-
European presence of a number of large banks with large cross-border
EU Treaty has undergone a series of amendments as its ambit and reach, both in terms of new
members and in terms of powers, became ever broader. See id. The latest amendment of the
EU Treaty is the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), also known as the
Lisbon Treaty 2009. See id.
10. See Jan Wouters & Thomas Ramopoulos, The G20 and Global Economic Governance: Lessons
from Multilevel European Governance, 15 J. OF INT'L EcON. L. 1, 2 (2012).
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operations lent urgency to questions about long-term protection of EU-wide
financial stability in the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements."
The so-called financial stability trilemma,12 which states that the three
objectives of financial stability, financial integration, and national financial
policies cannot be combined at the same time, has precisely described the
acute policy tradeoff which holds that one of these objectives has to give in
to safeguard the other two.13 In spite of assertions to the contrary,14 the
Eurozone debt crisis has proven beyond doubt that a common currency area
is not viable without building, at the same time, transnational supervisory
structures in the fields of fiscal monitoring and responsibility and bank
supervision and resolution. The loss of sovereignty essential in building a
fully integrated economy can of course be intolerable and the recent Brexit
plebiscite in the United Kingdom highlights the difficulty facing national
polities to accept such loss of sovereignty in a multitude of fronts including
the financial sector.
Arguably, an essential pre-requisite of financial market integration is
imposition of a harmonized set of core rules, which gradually gravitate
towards uniformity" and are binding on all jurisdictions comprising the
single market. The absence of such uniformity can, in theory, seriously
hinder market integration as it can give rise to regulatory arbitrage and
hidden protectionism. On the other hand, while protectionism harms
efficient group approaches to capital allocation and risk management within
11. For example, in 2005, Schoenmaker and Oosterloo conducted a statistical study spanning a
four-year period (2000-2003) on the potential emergence of pan-European banking groups. See
generally Dirk Schoenmaker & Sander Oosterloo, Financial Supervision in an Integrating Europe:
Measuring Cross-Border Externalities, 8 INT'L FIN. 1 (2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.584.2073 &rep=repl &type=pdf. To this effect, they gathered "[a] new data
set on cross-border penetration (as a proxy for cross-border externalities) of thirty large EU
banking groups." Id. They found a home country bias, but "the data indicate[d] that the
number of groups that have the potential to pose significant cross-border externalities within
the EU context" was not only substantial, but also increasing. Id. Policymakers, therefore, had
to "face the challenge of designing European structures for financial supervision and stability to
deal effectively with these emerging European banking groups." Id. at 1-2.
12. See generally Dirk Schoenmaker, The financial trilemma, 111 ECON. LETTERS 57 (Apr.
2011), http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/FinancialTrilemma.pdf. See also FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 142-50 (Jeroen J.M. Kremers, Dirk Schoenmaker & Peter J. Wierts
eds., 2003).
13. See Schoenmaker, supra note 12, at 57. Compare Lasta and Louis who (perhaps more
accurately) describe the same trade-off as an "'inconsistent quartet' of policy objectives: free
trade, full capital mobility, pegged (or fixed) exchange rates, and independent national monetary
policies." Rosa M. Lastra & Jean-Victor Louis, European Economic and Monetary Union: History,
Trends and Prospects, 32 Y.B. OF FUR. L. 57, 143 (2013), http://yel.oxfordjournals.org/content/
32/1/57.full.pdf.
14. See TOMMAso PADOA-SCHIOPPA, THE ROAD TO MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE: THE
EMPEROR, THE KINGS, AND THE GENIES (2000).
15. See JACQUES DE LAROSIZRE, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN
THE EU REPORT 27 (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/finances/
docs/delarosiere_report-en.pdf. Uniformity in this context only means the need to have
coherence and compatible rules and regulations across jurisdictions. See id.
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cross-border banks,16 regulatory arbitrage may have the opposite effect.17 So,
the key rationale behind maximum harmonization is not allocative efficiency
in an integrated market but building trust between the players. Certainty
that all players are being bound by the same detailed rules-even more so
when application is uniform (by means of centralized supervision
structures)-offers comfort to market competitors and supervisors that the
risk of rule-gaming and racing to the bottom-that would essentially
amount to free riding-becomes negligible.
There is no area where divergence of national rules and regulations is
more important than cross-border bank failures. Thus, protection of
financial stability in an integrated financial market characterized by cross-
border financial institutions becomes a very challenging task, especially
when there are incongruent policy measures between national preferences
and regional integration requirements. While, at the later stages of single
market development the EU has moved very close to maximum
harmonization in the field of financial market regulation, the overall
European regulatory edifice lacked strong uniformity/consistency both in
terms of rule construction and rule enforcement in this area. In addition,
there was a marked absence of institutions that could provide binding
guidance, in the event of difference of opinion between national regulators,
as regards the application and enforcement of inancial regulation, or could
resolve eventual conflicts of national regulatory actions.
B. EARLY STAGES OF EUROPEAN FINANciAL INTEGRATION
Financial integration in Europe began much earlier than the late
twentieth century, at least for the leading European markets. There is
convincing evidence, which shows that by the mid-eighteenth century
European equity markets were well integrated.s This was, in general, a
period characterized by a transition from autarky to integrated world capital
markets, and, thus, for many it constitutes the first era of globalization. The
term "financial integration," however, was not used in this sense before the
mid-1950s. German neoliberals during the 1950s advocated international
integration through removal of trade barriers and the introduction of free
convertibility. Machlup associated financial integration with capital
mobility.19 Ropke stated that multilateral trade and free convertibility were
only "a different expression" for international integration just as bilateralism
16. See id.
17. See id. For the benefits of regulatory competition, refer to Roberta Romano. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, YALE L. ScH., https://www.law.yale.edu/roberta-romano (last visited Oct. 24,
2016).
18. Larry Neal, Integration of International Capital Markets: Quantitative Evidence from the
Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries, 42 J. OF EcON. HIST. 219 June 1985); Larry Neal, The
Disintegration and Re-integration of International Capital Markets in the 19th Century, 21 Bus. &
ECON. HIST. 84 (1992), http://www.thebhc.org/sites/default/files/beh/BEHprint/v02l/pOO84-
p0096.pdf.
19. See FRITZ MACHLUP, A HISTORY OF THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1977).
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and capital controls are another name for international disintegration of the
economy. As this argument goes, the greater the degree of regional
integration by means of multilateralism and currency convertibility, the
larger the advantages of economic cooperation.20 Yet evidence of the
existence of a direct causal relationship between financial integration and
economic growth remains inconclusive,21 as any economic growth benefits
deriving from financial integration depend upon a number of preconditions
necessary to facilitate the integration process.22
When the six-state European Economic Community (EEC) was
established, in 1957 (by the Treaty of Rome), furthering Member States'
growth was the apparent but not sole objective of the founders. Political
integration was a stronger long-term objective. Namely, building a single
market was seen as an essential prerequisite to political integration and not a
self-standing goal. The fact that political integration in the EU is still
nowhere close to what was envisaged by the founding fathers can easily
explain the lack of adequate institutions supervising the single financial
market and securing financial stability. For example, one of the EU
fundamental freedoms for building an internal market, the free movement of
capital, became effective only after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, a full thirty-five years after the Treaty of Rome, and then because it
was essential in building a European monetary union and national
restrictions in the free flow of capital could no longer be retained.
C. AN EVER CLOSER UNION?
1. The Political Economy of Market Integration in the EU
The European economic integration process and the establishment of the
Euro as the common currency of (as of today) nineteen EU Member States
has been incremental with periods of strong progress alternating with
interludes of painfully slow growth. It has, also, been the product of political
expediencies as much as economic efficiency rationales. Thus, it has
witnessed major crises and setbacks.23
20. See ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 120 (James A. Dorn and
Wang Xi eds., 1990). See generally Wilhelm Ropke, THE SOCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME (Annette
Schiffer Jacobsohn & Peter Schiffer Jacobsohn trans., 1950), available at https://mises.org/
system/tdf/The%20Social%20Crisis%20of%200ur%20Time%20%2 81%29.pdfpfile=1 &type=
document.
2 1. See QUIAo Liu, PAUL LEJOT, & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FINANCE IN ASIA: INSTITUTIONS,
REGULATION AND POLICY 513 (2013).
22. Such integration prerequisites include domestic institutional reforms, the maintenance of
adequate and enforceable property rights, and adequate controls on money supply. See generally
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, supra note 20, at 121.
23. See Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, 29
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUD. 123 (Apr. 1996); JONATHAN STORY & INGO WALTER,
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: THE BATTLE OF THE
SYSTEMS (1997).
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Continental European economies have shown in the post-war era a
marked preference for exchange rate stability. When the first set of
European arrangements aiming at exchange rate stability failed, following
the collapse of the requisite Bretton Woods arrangements, and the post-war
world entered the era of floating exchange rates, EEC members created the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979,24 in order to manage and
control currency fluctuations among EMS members. EMS was viewed as
the first step towards permanent exchange rate alignment and paved the way
towards the establishment of EMU. Eventually, EMU Member States
irrevocably pegged the exchange rates of member country currencies, which
were replaced by single European currency.
At this point, the establishment of the single currency was itself a matter
of politics as much as economic necessity. Of course, through a currency
union, EU members could answer the classic monetary trilemma, which is
built on the Mundell-Fleming model of an open economy under capital
mobility.25 The monetary trilemma famously states that a fixed exchange
rate, capital mobility, and national monetary policy cannot be achieved at
the same time; one policy objective has to give. Therefore, under capital
mobility and national monetary policy, fixed exchange rates will invariably
break down.26 But, as the euro-area has been very far from being an optimal
currency area under the Mundell model27 and there was no fiscal integration
or debt mutualization, it was only a matter of time before differences in the
competitiveness of national economies gave rise to some serious strains.
Arguably, the founders of the EMU just hoped that a single currency would
pave the way for a fiscal and political union, something that has not yet
happened. At the same time, the political element of the EMU, as well as a
divergent economic and housing market cycle that had no realistic chance of
converging with continental economies was central to the United Kingdom's
decision not to participate in EMU.
Nonetheless, the desire for a political union might not have been the
whole story behind EU financial integration. From a political economy
viewpoint, European financial and monetary integration was not just an
inter-governmental goal, or merely dictated by the conditions of increasing
market integration and capital mobility in the EU. The interests of
professional intermediaries may have also been a strong force behind the
24. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY
MONETARY TEXTs 40-43, 53-54, 55-61 (1979); FRANCESCO GIAVAZZI & ALBERTO
GIOVANNINI, LIMITING EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY: THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
(1989).
25. See R. A. Mundell, Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange
Rates, 29 CAN. J. OF EcON. & POL. Sci. 475, 475-85 (Nov. 1963), http://jrxy.zjgsu.edu.cn/jrxy/
jssc/2904.pdf.
26. See Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, & Alan M. Taylor, The Trilemma in History:
Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility, 87 REV. OF EcON. &
STAT. 423, 423-38 (Aug. 2005).
27. Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REVIEw 657, 657-65 (1961).
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push for further integration. For example, the Eurobond and the
Eurocurrency interbank markets emerged as a result of national, legal, and
regulatory impediments to capital flows.28 Given an excess supply of petro-
dollars in offshore markets, their scale began to rival national markets in
banking and securities in the 1970s. This led to protracted negotiations in
the early 1990s between industry representatives and regulators that brought
offshore activity back into national markets, while subsuming the many
disparate local practices. In fact, the early Eurobond market might have
played the role of an imperfect substitute to financial integration, given that
capital mobility was only a secondary EU goal until the 1990s.29 Conversely,
the 1966 Segr6 report was both very cognizant of the growth potential
attached to financial integration and the potential for this objective to be
confounded by commercial interests.30 In this way, the United Kingdom-
as the leading center of the Eurobond and Eurocurrency markets-had a
keen interest in participating in the process of financial market integration,
while at the same time-from a political standpoint-maintaining its own
economic and political sovereignty. This was a balance that has eventually
proven impossible to hold.
2. EMU Membership Criteria and Realities
The path to monetary integration that was adopted by the Maastricht
Treaty was based on a three-stage process and the fulfilment of convergence
criteria. Only countries that met the appropriate criteria could gain
Eurozone membership. The transitional framework under the treaty
provided some flexibility in terms of the time required for the weaker
candidate economies to converge with the strongest, especially as regards
their macroeconomic outlooks and policies. But, such convergence proved
in many cases no more than drawing board plans.
The Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria included two basic
conditions for euro membership: firstly, a 3 percent limit on general
government annual deficit and a 6 percent limit on general government
28. See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, EUROPEAN ECONOMY: THE EU EcoNoMY: 2003 REVIEw 320 (2003), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/publication7694_en.pdf.
29. Robert L. Genillard, The Eurobond Market, 23 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 144 (1967).
The article concludes that the Eurobond market was a "fine example of the benefits of
international collaboration by bankers in a fully competitive climate." Id. See also Kurt
Richebcher, The Problems and Prospects of Integrating European Capital Markets, 1 JOURNAL OF
MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 336, 337 (1969).
30. See The Development of a European Capital Market, EUR. ECON. COMMUNITY COMM'N 337
(Nov. 1966), http://www.steuerrecht.jku.at/gwk/Dokumentation/Steuerpolitik/Gemeinschafts
dokumente/EN/Segre.pdf. "Segr6 argued for harmonization of non-retail national markets in
ways later encouraged by the Eurobond market." Douglas W. Amer, Paul Lejot, & Wei Wang,
Ten Years After: Post-crisis Financial Integration in East Asia, AIIFL & EAIEL n. 154 (Nov. 2007),
http://www.cpu.gov.hk/doc/en/events-conferencesseminars/20071123-arner-lejotwangnov
07.pdf.
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gross debt limit:' It also included three other important criteria, which
were inflation, long-term interest rates, and exchange rate fluctuations.
Inflation was to be kept within 1.5 percent margin over that of any of the
three EU countries having the lowest inflation rate. Long-term interest
rates were to stay within a 2 percent margin over that of the three states with
the lowest borrowing rates in the European Union.
As regards exchange-rate fluctuations, there was a requirement of
participation for two years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II),
which provided for a narrow band of exchange-rate fluctuations. The reality
was, however, in glaring contrast with the spirit of the Treaty, due to
political pressures and the actual condition of the European economies,
which even in the 1990s were mildly to grossly indebted states with
considerable budget deficits. The Treaty itself had exceptions to provide
political leverage in extending membership to certain countries while
restricting it to others.32 Italy, the third largest economy in continental
Europe was running general government gross debt in 1998 at 114.9 percent
of GDP (as against 60 percent required by the Treaty),33 Belgium's gross
government debt (home to the EU capital, Brussels) was at 117.4 percent of
GDP, and formation of a euro block was implausible without having both of
these countries in the Eurozone. This makes visible a huge difference in the
conditions of the European economies upon joining the Eurozone. In
practice, these differences meant a much lesser degree of economic
integration than had been envisaged in the earlier Werner (1970) and Delors
reports (1989) respectively.34 Moreover, the difference in the
macroeconomic "initial conditions" of the founding Member States made it
31. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, at Protocol on the
excessive debt procedure, art. 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:1 1992M/TXT&qid=1477506602813&from=EN.
32. Article 104c of the Maastricht Treaty stated that countries could exceed the 3 percent
deficit target if "the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that
comes close to the reference value" or "excess over the reference value is only exceptional and
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value." See Treaty on European Union,
supra note 31, at 27. Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community with a View to Establishing the European Community, art. 104c(2)(a). Euro area
countries could similarly exceed the 60 percent gross debt target provided that "the ratio is
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace." See id. art.
104c(2)(b).
33. As a result of sluggish growth and loss of competitiveness due to inability to depreciate
Italian national debt stands today at 142 percent, one of the highest in the developed world.
National Debt of Italy, NATIONALDEBTCLOCKS.ORG, http://www.nationaldebtclocks.org/debt
clock/Italy (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
34. Under the Delors' report, "[e]conomic union and monetary union form two integral" and
equally important "parts of a single whole and would therefore have to be implemented in
parallel." COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECON. AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 14 (Apr. 17, 1989), http:/
/aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary-delors.pdf. But the Delors' report adopted a comparatively less
centralized approach to economic policy than the Werner report. See id. at 14-15.
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politically difficult to enforce the strict fiscal criteria laid down for EMU
membership.
D. EU HARMONIZATION LEGISLATION 1985-2009: PLUGGING GAPS
AND LOOPHOLES
Completion of the legal and regulatory framework has always been
regarded as an essential prerequisite in the EU financial integration process.
The first step towards this direction was to develop a harmonized set of
minimum regulatory standards based on consensus.35 This seemed more
aligned with the overall objective of achieving a single market without
having to endure excessive concessions on idiosyncratic national policy
designs and preferences, which might make the harmonization process
politically untenable. This was a process in which the United Kingdom was
a very active, even leading, participant as well as beneficiary.
1. Harmonization Principles
The Delors Commission's 1985 White Paper36 preceded the enactment of
the first amendment to the Treaty of Rome in thirty years, the so-called
"Single European Act."37 The White Paper outlined the reforms required in
the pre-existing EEC legal framework in order to build a truly single market
in the EEC (as it then was) and pave the way to monetary integration.38 The
White Paper noted at the same time that: "the legislation adopted by the
Council and the European Parliament is either too detailed, or insufficiently
adapted to local conditions and experience; often in stark contrast to the
original proposals."39 But, maximum harmonization proved impossible for
many areas of activity in the single market and the European Commission
adopted instead the principles of mutual recognition, minimum
harmonization, and home country control-a system with minimal political
integration but maximum market integration-the balance always preferred
by the United Kingdom. The three principles were subsequently enshrined
in harmonization legislation in a number of areas, including financial
services. The internal market was to be based on minimum harmonization
35. This has been defined by one of the authors as the First EU financial services consensus.
See Emilios E. Avgouleas, The New EU Financial Markets Legislation and the Emerging Regime for
Capital Markets, 23 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 321 (Apr. 2005).
36. CoMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET:
WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 310 (1985).
37. See Legislation, 30 OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 June 29, 1987), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1987:169:FULL&from=EN.
38. The Delors' report provided for the establishment of a new monetary institution that
would be called a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), responsible for carrying out
monetary policy and the Community's exchange rate policy vis-i-vis third currencies. See Phase
3: the Delors Report, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/euro/emu/road/de
lors-report-en.htm (last updated Sept. 4, 2014).
39. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 36.
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of national regulatory systems and mutual recognition4o through which
Member States would recognize each other's laws, regulations, and
authorities.4' Use of minimum regional requirements was intended to limit
competitive deregulation by state actors and regulatory arbitrage by
commercial parties.42 It was also a reflection of how political collaboration
can encourage adoption of sound market principles and practices.43
The EU framework for financial services provided minimum standards for
the establishment and operation of banks and other financial intermediaries,
conduct of public offers on a national and pan-European basis, and extended
to accounting, company law, and regulation of institutional investors, in the
form of collective investments schemes. It also provided access to the single
market unfettered by national borders or restrictions on activity, the so-
called single passport facility.44 Essentially, the purpose of the passport
facility was to allow intermediaries to deliver products or services into any
part of the internal market and promote cross-border competition.45 As a
result, the "passport directives" in financial services defined the kind of
financial intermediary to which they applied, its activities and the market
segment, the conditions for initial and continuing authorizations, the
division of regulatory responsibility between the home (domicile) state and
the host state, and aspects of the regulatory treatment of Non-EU Member
States.46 Authorized financial intermediaries that came within the ambit of
one of the "passport directives" could, on the basis of the home country
license, offer banking and investment services on a cross-border basis
without maintaining a permanent presence in the target market or through a
foreign branch.47 The home state would generally be responsible for the
licensing and supervision of financial intermediaries, for their foreign
branches, and for the fitness and propriety of managers and major
shareholders. The host state would be responsible for conduct within their
jurisdiction or in the course of offering services cross-border to clients
residing within their jurisdiction.
40. Id.
41. See BENN STEIL ET AL., THE EUROPEAN EQuITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE UNION
AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILENNIUM (Benn Steil ed., Feb. 1, 1996).
42. See Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial
Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, 32 U. OF NEW
SOUTH WALES L. J. 488, 488-513 (2010).
43. See Douglas W. Arner, Paul Lejot, & Wei Wang, Assessing East Asian Financial Cooperation
and Integration, 12 SINGAPORE YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 1, 1-42 (2009).
44. EU financial services directives addressed issues relating to regulation of banks and
banking markets, investment services firms, collective investment schemes, life and non-life
insurance, and pension funds. See generally THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING
(Ross Cranston ed., 2d ed. 1995); EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT
SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1998).
45. See THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING, supra note 44; EUROPEAN
SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. For a good discussion of the ambit of provisions for investment firms, see NIAIH
MOLONEY, EC SEC. REGULATION 379-460 (2d ed. 2008).
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The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union as a
successor to the EEC, provided an impetus for states to implement key
financial services directives and led to members other than Ireland and the
United Kingdom adopting legislation that was often foreign to their
traditional market practices. One important influence in the success of the
harmonization mechanisms adopted at this stage of EU integration process
was the role played by the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ,
now the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)). Being part of the
EU obligated its Member States to adopt and implement EU legislation, as
national governments could be held liable in damages for failing to comply
with EU-level decisions.48
2. The Gradual Shift To "Maximum" Harmonization
The "passport directives" clearly enhanced financial integration in the EU,
although areas of marked divergence, such as retail financial services,
remained prior to 2008 and continue to remain today.49 But minimum
harmonization left the EU with an incomplete regulatory framework,
because, in many cases, it merely augmented rather than replaced pre-
existing national laws.50 Thus, the drive towards harmonization intensified
in the early 2000s, following the introduction of the Euro and the
publication of the Commission's Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in
1999.51 Arguably, the most important integrative instrument of that era
(which can be viewed as the second EU financial services consensus)52 was
the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID), which
established a detailed pan-European regime with respect to conditions of
establishment and operation of financial markets and investment
intermediaries and the conduct of cross-border financial activities53
48. Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, Bonifaci v. Italian
Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-05357 (establishing liability of Member States for failure to implement
a directive).
49. Emiliano Grossman & Patrick Leblond, European Financial Integration: Finally the Great
Leap Forward?, 49 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 413, 415, 419-20 (Mar. 2011).
50. For a discussion of the incomplete regulatory framework and the gaps left behind by
minimum harmonization, see generally Emilios Avgouleas, The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct
in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection, 6 EUR. L. J. 72
(Mar. 2000).
51. See Financial Services: Implementing The Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM
(1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999) available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/finances/docs/
actionplan/index/action-en.pdf.
52. For the second EU financial services consensus and a critical discussion of FSAP
legislation, see Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of The New EC Financial-Market
Regulation: Peaks, Troughs, and the Road Ahead, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. 179, 184-85 (2005).
53. See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/61 1/EEC and 93/6/EEC and
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L145) 1. For a discussion of the contours of the MiFID, see
THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT SERVICES IN EUROPE UNDER MiFID: IMPLEMENTATION
AND PRACTICE (Emilios Avgouleas ed., 2008).
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National implementation of MiFID from 2007 onwards represented the
third stage of single market development.54
To answer a number of challenges pertaining mostly to enactment and
consistent implementation of inancial services legislation, the EU adopted
the so-called Lamfalussy process in 2001. It consisted of four levels that
started with the adoption of the framework legislation (Level One) and more
detailed implementing measures (Level Two). For the technical preparation
of the implementing measures, the Commission was to be advised by the
committees made up of representatives of national supervisory bodies from
three sectors: banking, insurance and occupational pensions, and the
securities markets. These committees were CEBS,55 CEIOPS,56 and
CESR.57 The Level Three committees contributed to the consistent
implementation of Community directives in the Member States, ensuring
effective cooperation between the supervisory authorities and convergence
of their practices (Level Three) and finally, the Commission was to enforce
timely and correct transposition of EU legislation into national laws (Level
Four).58
54. EMILios AVGOULEAS & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, THE EUROZONE DEBT CRISIS AND THE
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: A CAUTIONARY TALE OF FAILURE AND REFORM 15 (2013); see
Legislation in force: MiFID 1, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/mifid/
indexen.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2016).
55. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory
group on banking supervision in the EU was establish by the European Commission in 2004.
Commission Decision 2004/5, art. 1-2, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 36. OnJanuary 1, 2011, this committee
was succeeded by the European Banking Authority (EBA), which took over all existing and
ongoing tasks and responsibilities of the CEBS. Regulation No. 1093/2010 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing
Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 21.
56. The Commissions of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS) (2003-2010) was established under the European Commission in November 2003.
Commission Decision 2004/6, arts. 1-2, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 30. The CEIOPS was later replaced by
the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (EIOPA) in Jan. 2011 in
accordance with the new European financial supervision framework. Commission Decision
2009/79, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28.
57. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was an independent
committee of European securities regulators established by the European Commission on June
6, 2001. Commission Decision 2009/77, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (25) 18. On January 1, 2011, CESR
was replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in accordance with the
new European financial supervision framework. Regulation No. 1095/2010 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and
repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84, 93.
58. See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation ofEuropean Securities Markets,
at 37-41 (Feb. 15, 2001), http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wise
men/final-report-wise-men en.pdf; Alexander Schaub, The Lamfalussy process four years on, 13 J.
FIN. REG. AND COMPLIANCE 110, 110-120 (2005). See generally EILIs FERRAN, Understanding
the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision, in FINANCIAL REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIs ANALYSIS 111-58 (Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt &
Guido Ferrarini eds., 2012).
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In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the EU has introduced
a number of pan-European bodies with regulatory and supervisory
competence and developed a common rulebook.59 The new institutions that
the EU has built since 2009 are discussed in the ensuing sections.
III. The Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Debt Crisis
As mentioned earlier, it was not until the 2008 crisis and in earnest after
the outbreak of the Eurozone debt crisis in 2010 that the vexed issue of
preservation of financial stability in an integrated market came to the
forefront of EU policy-makers' attention. Both crises have emphasized the
need to revisit existing models of financial market integration with a view of
enriching them with institutions and structures that underpin financial
stability as well as economic growth. It should be noted here that the
Maastricht Treaty (1992) did not include "financial stability" as a key
objective of the ECB, although, article 127(5) of TFEU underscores
"financial stability" as a classic central banking good. Thus, financial
stability was not designed as one of the four basic tasks to be carried through
the European System of Central Banks (article 127(2) of TFEU) and rather
was clustered with prudential supervision under the "non-binding tasks" of
the ECB. This is, of course, in marked contrast to all post-2009 EU
financial services legislation, which has financial stability either as core or
chief auxiliary objective.
A. BACKGROUND
Until the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, the
common passport facility was at the heart of the EU market integration
effort. The EU legislative framework based on harmonized standards for
financial markets sought equivalence among disparate national regulatory
and legal systems, so that regional initiatives could recognize the
idiosyncrasies of national legal and regulatory regimes.60 But a multi-level
governance system involves far more complexity than a regime based on
minimum harmonization can foresee. These mainly arise out of the
conflicting and sometimes misunderstood national implementation and
enforcement priorities and interpretation of harmonization legislation.
But where the EU moved faster to offer direct regulation and or
maximum harmonization of national standards this move was not welcomed
by the polities of several member states, due to so-called "democratic
deficit,"61 giving rise to what was subsequently dubbed "Euroscepticism." In
59. See Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, at 27-29, 46-56 (Feb.
25, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/delarosierereport-en. pdf.
60. See STEIL ET AL., supra note 41, at 113.
61. This broadly meant that the EU Commission officials that produced the core of European
regulations were not elected. In a way this was a rhetoric scheme, especially, from the
viewpoint of democratic legitimacy formalities (though, perhaps, accurate, in terms of
substance), since most EU legislation was co-produced with the Council which comprises
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fact, the European Union was viewed even prior to 2008 as "too intrusive"
and "remote" an institution in need of a more coherent set of policies within
existing treaties.62 As this view gathered pace across the EU but especially in
the United Kingdom it eventually culminated the in "leave" outcome (so-
called Brexit) of the British 2016 EU Referendum.
Political considerations also undermined the credibility of rule-based
frameworks for coordination of national fiscal policies in the Eurozone.63
For example, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was originally designed
to safeguard sound public finances and to thwart individual Eurozone
members from adopting fiscal policies leading to unsustainable debt levels by
enforcing budgetary discipline. Nonetheless, France and Germany, faced
with a breach of the 3 percent deficit limit in 2002-04, pushed through a
watering down of the SGP rules by March 2005. Arguably, the Maastricht
Treaty itself allowed sufficient flexibility to the interpretation and
enforcement as to allow it to become part of the political bargaining process
in the EU at the expense of objective economic criteria.64
In the first decade of its life, the EMU was premised on a weak
institutional framework that was more suitable to a "fair weather currency,"65
rather than a monetary union with asymmetrical member economies, which
were about to experience massive macro-economic shocks. During the
period that the debt crisis was building up, the Eurozone was deeply marked
by economic and financial imbalances and the Union itself lacked a central
fiscal authority, which would have afforded it a credible mechanism to
enforce budget discipline. In addition, trade imbalances due to accelerating
competitiveness imbalances and lack of exchange rate flexibility meant that
there were no realistic prospects for fiscal convergence.66 Yet, preserving, in
the long-term, any currency union, including the EMU, requires a sufficient
level of economic convergence, together with a properly functioning
internal market, and an effective system for economic and budgetary policy
surveillance and coordination. In addition, it seems unlikely that a strong
form Monetary Union can survive without balanced trade flows and some
elected member state politicians and the EU Parliament, whose members are elected by means
of pan-European elections. See House of Commons, The European Union: A democratic
institution?, Research Paper 14/25 (Apr. 29, 2014). Of course, the irony is that the parties and
individuals who complained about EU's democratic deficit, and rightly so to some extent, are
members of the same coalition that asks the UK to leave the European Convention of Human
Rights.
62. See Comm'n White Paper on European Governance, at 12, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25,
2001).
63. C. FRED BERGSTEN & JACOB FUNK KIRKEGAARD, THE COMING RESOLUTION OF THE
EUROPEAN CRISIS 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Pol'y Brief No. PB12-1, Jan. 2012), http://
www.ciaonet.org/pbei/iie/0024277/f_0024277_19801.pdf.
64. See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council paras. 3, 7 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/84335.pdf.
65. BERGSTEN & KIRKEGAARD, supra note 63, at 5.
66. See PAUL DE GRAUWE, ECONOMICS OF MONETARY UNION pt. 2 (9th ed. 2012).
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form of fiscal burden sharing. But the EMU-which presents neither of
those two characteristics-has confounded expectations so far.
When the GFC broke out with force, European financial stability was
hampered by a number of pre-existing problems that had simply been
ignored for far too long. These included colossal pre-crisis public and
private debt loads, a flawed macroeconomic framework, and absence of
institutions capable of handling effectively a cross-border banking crisis.
The incomplete institutional design was the true mark of an imbalanced and
disjointed monetary union, which, as explained above, also lacked an
effective fiscal convergence mechanism. Essentially, it was assumed that any
macroeconomic or banking system stability shocks could be dealt with at the
national level without requiring any transfers from the strongest to the
weaker members of the Eurozone, based on the no bailout clause in the
EMU Treaty.67 Consequently, the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in
the Eurozone in 2010 meant that the EU had to enter into the most
transformative phase of its history. This phase would, in the end, bind euro-
area members closer together at the expense of further alienation of
reluctant members of the club like the United Kingdom.
While the 2008 crisis intensified reform efforts to a great extent, the true
catalyst for the emergence of pan-European supervisory and bank resolution
structures has been the ensuing Eurozone debt crisis, which has shaken to its
foundations the banking system of the Eurozone. The EU had to devise
mechanisms, in the midst of crisis, firstly, to prevent an immediate
meltdown of its banking sector and ensuing chain of sovereign bankruptcies
and, secondly, to reform its flawed institutions, in order to prevent the
Eurozone architecture from collapsing. Namely, Eurozone members had to
build both a crisis-fighting capacity and support bailout funding
mechanisms. This has led to the establishment of a European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF), superseded by the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). At the same time, serious steps have been taken to build a European
Banking Union based on structures safeguarding centralization of bank
supervision and uniform deposit insurance arrangements, as well as
centralization of crisis-resolution.
B. PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION - CROSS-BORDER BANKING
The premise of home-country control and the principle of minimum
harmonization were bound, at some point, to undermine the stability of the
EU banking system. The integration process had continued apace in an
increasingly de-regulated market following the intensification of
liberalization efforts in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but the
regulatory standards and supervisory principles were not adjusted to new
realities. The Eurozone crisis brought home with devastating force the
potential risks of financial market integration reflecting the main findings of
67. See Treaty on European Union art. 101, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 OJ. (C 326) 88 (now Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union art. 125).
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the aforementioned financial stability trilemma. Financial integration had
led financial institutions operating in the single market to develop very tight
links of interconnectedness, allowing thus shocks appearing in one part of
the market to be transmitted widely and quickly across all other parts.
Examples of such rapid transmission of shocks included the failure of
Icelandic banks, the botched rescue of Fortis bank,68 the threat of collapse of
the financial systems of Ireland and Spain, and the possibility of a sovereign
default (e.g., Greece), or of a chain of sovereign defaults. Each of those
crises brought serious tremors to European markets and exposed their
fragility and the dearth of policy options available to Eurozone decision-
makers.
In contrast, in the United States, following the initial shock from the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the response to the crisis was rapid and came
in the form of state purchases of distressed bank assets so-called Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), innovative intervention schemes by the
Federal Reserve, and (complex) re-regulation of the financial sector. In the
EU, however, the diversity of Member State economies and issues arising
out of inherent contradictions between national policy priorities meant a
much lower degree of responsiveness to the crisis. This became evident as
soon as some of the EMU states, which experienced a more severe crisis than
other members, had to adopt policies based on their own national needs and
interests-which may not necessarily have been in conformity with single
market policies. For example, lack of common deposit insurance in a well-
integrated banking market at a time of cross-border crisis led to several
conflicting policy choices and responses in an effort by the states to protect
their own citizens.69
C. THE EUROzoNE DEBT CRISIS
In Europe, the global banking and liquidity crisis soon transformed into a
complex and multilayered regional crisis. As soon as a series of public
bailouts took the issue of the continuing solvency of banks in the United
Kingdom, United States, and Western Europe out of the limelight, the state
of Irish and Spanish banks and the possibility of a Greek default brought the
lurking woes of the Eurozone into sharp focus. Ireland and Greece
triggered the second and more lethal wave of the crisis of confidence that hit
most of Europe since 2010-although Italy and Spain might in the end
prove much bigger threats to the Eurozone's survival than Greece, Portugal
and Ireland, which represent only a very small faction of Eurozone GDP.
The Eurozone crisis should be seen as a sequence of four interlocking
crises resulting from imbalanced monetary integration. This sequence
resulted in a competitiveness crisis that transformed into a marked loss of
fiscal revenues and widening fiscal deficits which led to debt accumulations
68. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 10-12 (Mar. 2010).
69. Id.
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(particularly in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that were financed by the
surpluses of the northern countries, reflecting, in turn, to massive payment
imbalances within the Eurozone (in particular, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Finland vis-'i-vis the European South). As said surpluses had to be re-
invested they led to accumulation of unsustainable levels of public or private
debt or both. Essentially, surpluses found their way to the public and private
debt markets of deficit countries (Greece, Italy) or to the banking systems of
the Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Spain) and financed gigantic real estate
bubbles in Ireland and Spain.7o
The Eurozone crisis has signaled a fundamental shift in the political
dynamics underpinning the EU. While the exact remedies of the crisis:
austerity, more integration, mutualization of Eurozone members' debt and
other measures remain the topic of heated discussion, one remedy is viewed
as uncontroversial. Namely, it is quite beyond dispute that the Eurozone
crisis would have been much less severe, if EU members could find a way to
break up the link between bank debt and sovereign indebtedness, which, of
course, created a vicious circle of ever more bank bailouts and ever-higher
levels of national debt. The fact that many EU banks had invested in EU
Member State bonds and were also adversely affected by the continuous
recession ravaging the periphery of the Eurozone only made things worse.
As mentioned above, the EMU, although it had interest rate setting
competence through the ECB, had until recently been devoid of any binding
mechanism to effectively enforce fiscal and banking stability. Both are areas
of serious national interest where pooling of sovereignty was regarded, until
recently, as intolerable. Moreover, since its establishment, the EMU lacked
these crucial supporting institutions that could have helped it to restore
financial stability during times of acute uncertainty and market volatility.7'
In the beginning it was thought that EMU Member States could break the
vicious circle between bank bailouts and levels of sovereign indebtedness, by
means of establishing a funding facility the ESM, which, subject to a strict
conditionality, could be employed to directly recapitalize Eurozone banks.
Fears of burden sharing between the richer and the weaker Eurozone
members through the ESM, which enjoys the guarantee of all Eurozone
members, and the need to tighten the framework for bank regulation,
supervision, and resolution have meant that the countries in the core of the
Eurozone have put a stop to direct (through the ESM) bank recapitalizations
and just promoted the centralization of bank supervision and resolution
functions in the EMU. Said centralization has given birth to a new set of
bank authorization, supervision, and resolution arrangements, which
together comprise the so-called European Banking Union. As the United
Kingdom did not participate in the EMU and was not part of the Banking
Union, its exit from the EU could provide further glue to Banking Union
70. See generally Emilios Avgouleas, Eurozone Crisis and Sovereign Debt restructuring:
Intellectual Fallacies and New Lines of Research presentation to Soc'y of Int'l Econ. L. 3rd
Biennial Glob. Conf. (July 2012).
71. BERGSTEN & KIRKEGAARD, supra note 63, at 2.
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arrangements but for German opposition to any kind of burden sharing for
cross-border bank failures, including its continuous opposition to a single
deposit guarantee scheme for Europe (discussed in section III.C below).
IV. EU Financial Regulation Infrastructure in the post-2009
period: Phase I - From the Lamfalussy Process to the ESFS
A. THE LAROSIERE REFORMS
In November 2008, the Commission appointed a High Level Group
(chaired by Jacques de Larosiere) to study the Lamfalussy framework in light
of the GFC and the threats to cross-border banking and the internal market
that the GFC uncovered, and to make recommendations for a new EU
regulatory set up.72 The proposals advanced by the de Larosidre report were
instrumental to subsequent developments. In order to implement the
recommendations of the de Larosiere committee, the EU established
(through a series of Regulations, normally referred to as the ESAs founding
Regulations) an integrated European System of Financial Supervision
(ESFS), which came into effect in December 2010.73 It comprises the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)74 and a decentralized network
comprising existing national supervisors (who would continue to carry out
day-to-day supervision) and three new European Supervisory Authorities
(ESAs): the European Banking Authority (EBA),75 the European Insurance
and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities
Markets Authority (ESMA), which respectively replaced the corresponding
Lamfalussy Level Three Committees: CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR.
Furthermore, colleges of supervisors76 were to be put in place for all major
72. See generally Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, supra note 59.
73. Regulation No. 1095/2010, art. 2, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
Nov. 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/
77/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84, 94.
74. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established on December 16, 2010, in
response to the ongoing financial crisis. Regulation No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the
financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1. It has
been tasked with the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system of the financial system
within the EU in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to
financial stability in the EU. See id.
75. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) as an independent advisory
group on banking supervision in the EU was establish by the European Commission in 2004.
Commission Decision of 5 Nov. 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 28. On January 1, 2011, this committee was succeeded by the
European Banking Authority (EBA), which took over all existing and ongoing tasks and
responsibilities of the CEBS. See Regulation No. 1092/2010, supra note 74.
76. The Colleges of Supervisors are mechanisms for the exchange of information between
home and host authorities and for the planning and performance of key supervisory tasks in a
coordinated or joint manner, including all aspects of ongoing supervision. See generally Comm.
of Eur. Banking Supervisors document on CEBS' Guidelines for the Operational Functioning of
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cross-border institutions because supervision of strategic decisions at the
consolidated level requires a college of supervisors to understand the global
effects and externalities of those decisions.77 Last but not least, a Joint
Committee was formed by the European Supervisory Authorities to
coordinate their actions on cross-sectoral rule-making and supervisory
matters.78
ESAs work with the ESRB to ensure financial stability and to strengthen
and enhance the EU supervisory framework. Apart from issuing guidance
and recommendations to national supervisors,79 ESAs also seek to formulate
a single EU rulebook and harmonize technical standards on the basis of
powers conferred by the EU commission,80 which subsequently will be
adopted by the European Commission to become formal/binding EU law.s1
In order to safeguard consistent application of harmonized legislation, if the
ESAs find a national supervisory authority failing to apply EU law, they have
the power to investigate infractions, with the relevant Authority having the
power to directly issue recommendations to national supervisors to remedy
potential infractions, followed by a formal opinion from the Commission (if
the recommendation is not acted upon). If the supervisor does not comply
with the Commission's formal opinion, the ESA may then take decisions
directly binding on firms or market participants concerned to ensure that
they comply with EU law.
In adverse situations, ESAs have wider-ranging powers.82 In a crisis, they
will provide EU-wide coordination.83 If an emergency is declared, the ESAs
Supervisory Colleges (GL 34) June 15, 2010), http://www.eba.europa.eu/Supervisory-Colleges/
Introduction.aspx. They also handle the preparation for and response to emergencies. See
generally id. These are permanent structures for facilitating cooperation and coordination
among the EU authorities responsible for the supervision of the different components of cross-
border insurance or banking groups or other financial conglomerates. See generally id. For the
operating principles of the Colleges, see generally id.; Comm. of Eur. Banking Supervisors document
Colleges of Supervisors - 10 Common Principles, CEBS 2008 124 Jan. 27, 2009), http://
eba.europa.eu/getdoc/aeecafla-8 1b5-476a-95dd-599c5e967697/Clean-V3 -formatted-CEBS-
2008-124-CEIOPS-SEC-08-54-.aspx.
77. In a sense, this followed similar proposals as to how regulations of cross-border banking in
the EU had to be structured. See, e.g., FORUM ON FINANCIAL CROSS-BORDER GROUPS,
UNICREDIT GROUP, DIscussIoN PAPER No. 1, CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE: WHAT
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION? 5, 16-17 (Mar. 2009), https://www.unicreditgroup.eu/
content/dam/unicreditgroup/documents/inc/press-and-media/cross border-banking
.discussionpaper.pdf. The paper suggests that the supervision of cross-border banks had to be
based on three tiers: day-to-day supervision remaining with national supervisors, as these
supervisors would be close to the business, while supervisory decisions affecting an entire cross-
border groups would be made by the Colleges of Supervisors (with legally binding authority),
and a European Banking Authority (EBA) based on the de Larosiere Group recommendations
would facilitate information sharing and coordination among supervisors. See id.
78. Regulation No. 1095/2010, supra note 73, arts. 54-56 (establishing the Joint Committee).
79. Id. art. 8 (defining tasks and powers of the Authority); see also id. arts. 10-17.
80. Id. art. 11 (power to adopt regulatory technical standards).
81. Id. art. 10 (definition of and process for adoption of regulatory technical standards).
82. Id. art. 18 (action in emergency situations).
83. Council Regulation 1093/2010, art. 31, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 32 (EU).
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may make decisions that are binding on national supervisors and on firms,
and will mediate in certain situations where national supervisory authorities
disagree. If necessary, they will be able to resolve disputes by making a
decision that is binding on both of the parties to ensure compliance with EU
law.84 They have a role in EU supervisory colleges to ensure that they
function efficiently and that consistent approaches and practices are
followed.85 ESAs conduct regular peer eviews of national supervisory
authorities across the EU,86 and they can collect information from national
supervisors to allow them to fulfill their role.87 This information is used for
analyzing market developments, coordinating EU-wide stress tests, and for
the macroprudential analysis undertaken by the ESRB.ss They also have the
competence to consider consumer protection issues.89
The ESFS did not remedy the "mismatch" between the geographic scope
of European bank activities and the regulatory remit of the authorities
supervising them. Therefore, even after the implementation of the de
Larosiere reforms, cross-border supervision and bank resolution at the EU
level remained decentralized and, in want of further clarification as to how
ESAs would be able to control and manage their complicated tasks when
parties involved, would include non-EU countries.90 And then, if any major
European bank or financial institution failed, it would certainly have
repercussions outside the EU, though no provision was made for formalized
cooperation structures with third country regulators beyond those provided
in the (informal) context of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board.91
A binding mediation mechanism would be required, in any case, to deal
with cross-border supervisory problems. Without such an effective and
binding mechanism, some Member States might, in the future, try to limit
the branching activities of any firm regulated only by a home supervisor,
who is judged to have failed to meet the required standards of supervisory
84. Id. arts. 19-21, at 28, 29.
85. Id. arts. 27, 29, at 31.
86. Id. art. 30, at 32.
87. Id., art. 36, at 34.
88. Id., arts. 36, 23, at 30, 34; see also Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L331 (EU).
89. Council Regulation 1093/2010, art. 9, 26, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 23, 31 (EU).
90. E.g., Jamie Dimon has raised a very pertinent question with respect to the effectiveness of
regulatory reforms: "has anyone bothered to study the cumulative effect of these regulatory and
market fixes?" on June 7, 2011. Ben Bernanke, the Fed Chairman issued a statement, as
reproduced by Barth, "the central bank doesn't have the quantitative tools to study the net
impact of all the regulatory and market changes over the last three years. . . It's too
complicated" to study the new regulations' effect. Moreover, James Barth contends that not
everyone is convinced of the new regulations in place (in case of the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act)
have solved the too-big-to-fail problem, yet the biggest banks have not been downsized despite
the presence of a general consensus from various stake-holders. See James R. Barth and
Apanard Prabha, Breaking (Banks) Up is Hard to Do: New Perspective on Too Big To Fail, MILKEN
INST. (Dec. 3, 2012), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-16.pdf.
91. Thorsten Beck, The Future ofBanking (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, 2011), http://voxeu
.org/sites/default/files/file/the future of banking.pdf.
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practice. Such fragmentation would represent a major step backwards for the
single market.92
In some ways, this structure was a necessity of the United Kingdom's
refusal to participate in EMU and to countenance the necessary pooling of
sovereignty to make it work in the aftermath of the crisis. Given London's
position as the predominant financial center within the EU, this was a major
stumbling bloc.
B. PHASE 11: FROM THE ESFS TO THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION
The nature of the regulatory architecture itself may not be an important
cause of a financial crisis. Yet, the institutional design can be very important
for the prevention and resolution of a major financial crisis. A framework of
systemic risk controls and robust micro-prudential regulations deals with
prevention. Crisis management and resolution, on the other hand, require
established supervisory and resolution structures, which, in an integrated
market, must have a cross-border remit in order to override or subsume the
principle of home country control.93 For a very long time and until the
different pillars of the European Banking Union come into place, the
regulatory structures of the EU have been characterized by three principles:
decentralization, lack of coordination and segmentation. A careful look at
the developmental phase of European institution-building reveals this has
been a process of experimentation rather than design.94 The preceding
analysis of the crisis and of the responses to it has shown that the
inadequacies of the EU financial and institutional framework have played an
important role in undermining the stability of the Eurozone financial sector
during the crisis.
The EU Treaties did not establish clear institutional borders as a
prerequisite for the efficient functioning of multilevel European governance.
This flaw was most evident in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. European
responses to this crisis highlighted the current role of and power balance
among EU institutions and Member States where the Union continues only
to react to, and very rarely foresees, urgent needs and international
developments which call for a speedy reaction. "Who does what" in Europe
has been occupying policy-makers for many years.95 A "competence
catalogue" was included in the Lisbon Treaty, which has been in force since
92. European Council Press Release 11650/12, Country-Specific Recommendations on
Economic and Fiscal Policies (June 22, 2012).
93. Luis Garicano & Rosa Lastra, Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven
Principles, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 597, 597-621 (2010); see also Heliodoro Arroyo, The EUs Fiscal
Crisis and Policy Response: Reforming Economic Governance in the EU (2011), http://www.oecd.org/
gov/budgetingandpublicexpenditures/48871475.pdf.
94. Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Crisis: Financial Trilemma in Europe (2009), http://www
.voxeu.org/article/financial-crisis-and-europe-s-financial-trilemma.
95. European Governance - A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final (Dec. 10, 2001).
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December, 1, 2009.96 This distinguishes between EU and the Member State
powers/competences on the basis of the principle of conferral and
recognition. Essentially, for the first time in the EU's history, it has been
explicitly enshrined in the treaties that are not conferred upon the Union
and, instead, remains with the Member States.97
Since 2011, the EU as a whole has embarked on a number of initiatives to
build an integrated surveillance framework with respect to (1) the
implementation of fiscal policies under the Stability and Growth Pact to
strengthen economic governance and to ensure budgetary discipline, and (2)
the implementation of structural reforms. As a first step, Eurozone heads of
state adopted the intergovernmental Euro Plus Pact, to strengthen the
economic pillar of EMU and achieve a new quality of economic policy
coordination, with the objective of improving competitiveness and thereby
leading to a higher degree of convergence. As this remains outside the
existing institutional framework, a constitutional amendment to the EMU
will be required to implement it.98 In addition, the European Parliament
and the Council adopted a "six-pack" set of legislative acts, aimed at
strengthening the Eurozone's economic governance by reduction of deficits
through tighter control of national finances.99 The reforms represented the
most comprehensive reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and
the euro area since the launch of the EMU almost twenty years ago. This
legislative package aims to employ concrete and decisive steps towards
ensuring fiscal discipline in order to stabilize the EU economy and to avert
new crisis in future.
But the most important development has been the implementation of the
Banking Union. Also, the implementation of mandatory bail-ins aims at
containing the impact of the banking crisis on the sovereign by making
bailouts nearly impossible,oo a measure that has not inspired universal
enthusiasm.ioi
96. Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=
CELEX%3Al2007L%2FTXT.
97. Jan Wouters & Thomas Ramopoulos, supra note 10, at 751-75.
98. European Council 24/25 Mar. 2011 Conclusions, No. 10/1/11 of Apr. 20, 2011; European
Council 9 Dec. 2011 Conclusions, No. 139/1/11 of Jan. 25, 2012.
99. The legislative "six-pack" set of European economic governance architecture reforms
comprised five regulations and one directive, and was proposed by the European Commission
to come into force on December 13, 2011. See Council Regulation 1173/2011, 2011 O.J. (L
306) 1 (EU); Council Regulation 1174/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8 (EU); Council Regulation
1175/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12 (EU); Council Regulation 1176/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25
(EU); Council Regulation 1177/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25 (EU); Council Directive 2011/85/
EU, 2011 O.J. (L 306)41 (EU); see also Council Regulation 1175/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 15, 16
(EU).
100. Ellis Ferran, Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market
Supervision, in FIN. REG. & SUPERVISION (2012).
101. See Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins, 1 J. FIN.
REG. 3, 3-29 (2015).
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Breaking up the vicious circle of bank debt piling up on sovereign debt is a
matter of utmost importance for the survival of the Eurozone. EU members
need to complete the adjustment of internal and external imbalances to
repair financial sectors and to achieve sustainable public finances.102 The
economic and financial crisis has exacerbated pressure on the public finances
of EU Member States where twenty-three out of the twenty-seven Member
States fall in the so-called "excessive deficit procedure" (EDP). EDP is a
mechanism established by the EU Treaties obliging countries to keep their
budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP and government debts below 60
percent of GDP. Accordingly, the Member States running any excess deficit
must comply with the recommendations and deadlines as decided by the EU
Council to correct their excessive deficit.103 Piling up debt in their effort to
bail out Europe's ailing banks only makes things worse. In addition, it raises
the cost of borrowing for Eurozone members to unsustainable levels,
necessitating continuous bailouts by wealthier members of the Eurozone in
an effort to keep the EMU from breaking up. But such sovereign bailouts
are not only very expensive; they are also highly unpopular with the citizens
of lender countries.104
The Liikanen report has proposed solutions to separate deposit-taking
banking from riskier banking activities.10 But a comprehensive EU mandate
on structural reform of the EU banking sector may take some time as the
EU faces so many existential problems on numerous fronts.
Perhaps as important in stabilizing euro-markets, but impossible to be
long-lived, has been ECB activism through its Quantitative Easing program
and the still unused so-called Outright Monetary Transactions have
stabilized market conditions in sovereign debt markets. Like the
establishment and operation of the ESM,106 these measures just passed the
test of legality under the TFEU Treaty and, arguably, the CJEU was very
accommodative of the need to adopt practical measures to avert a Eurozone
meltdown.107
102. Commission Staff Working Document on European Economic Forecast (an. 2012), http://
ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/european-economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-1_en.pdf.
103. There is however, mounting criticism of the conditionality of deficit reduction by
pursuing austerity measures and tighter control of national expenses, especially on the Member
States facing financial stresses. See, e.g., Riccardo Bellofiore, "Two or Three Things I Know About
Her": Europe in the Global Crisis and Heterodox Economics, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 497 (2013)
(who perceives a way out of crisis requires not only monetary reforms and expansionary
coordinated fiscal measures, but also a wholesale change of economic model built upon a new
"engine" of demand and growth that requires monetary financing of "good" deficits).
104. Commission Staff Working Document on European Economic Forecast (uly 2012), http://
ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/european-economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-1_en.pdf.
105. Erkki Liikanen, High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector
(Oct. 2, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/bank/docs/high-level-expert-group/report
en.pdf.
106. Thomas Pringle v Gov't of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Nov. 27, 2012, CJEU
Case C-370/12.
107. Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutsche Bundestag, CJEU, Case C-62/14.
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Finally, irrespective of the progress already achieved on the policy side,
the experience of the past eight years reflects that reversal of sentiment in
financial markets and the widening of interest rate spreads can happen very
rapidly if the implementation of radical measures falters or the measures do
not seem radical enough to meet the requisite challenges. This is a very
important qualification as the high levels of bank non-performing loans
(NPLs) in the periphery of the Eurozone are a very important time-bomb,los
not only as regards the financial health of member states' banks, but also vis-
'i-vis resolution of the looming debt overhang, supply of new loans, and
negative impact on GDP growth. Arguably, the slow level of NPL
resolution (e.g., Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal) and of bank
recapitalization (e.g., Deutsche Bank) raises questions about the wisdom of
not using the ESM as a possible Eurozone bad bank of last resort.109
V. The European Banking Union
The EBU has, in principle, three pillars: a unified supervision mechanism
(the SSM), operated by the ECB, a single resolution mechanism with no
fiscal backstops (the SRM), and a future pan-European deposit guarantee
scheme (DGS).
A. THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (SSM)
1. Overview
As mentioned earlier, the EU's reliance on national supervisory structures
for the single market proved to be flawed. The failure of the rudimentary
crisis management coordination mechanisms that were in place, through the
Lamfalussy level-three committees, lacked both the competence and the
resources to cope with a cross-border banking crisis that endangered
taxpayers' money. Lack of appropriate coordination structures was most
evident regarding bank recovery and resolution. Similarly, the complete
absence of a centralized EU structure dealing with systemic risk monitoring
was incomprehensible. The most important of those gaps in the Eurozone
institutional edifice is about to be remedied through the establishment of the
first and most significant pillar of the proposed European Banking Union,
the SSM.
108. S. Aiyar et al., A strategy for resolving Europe's problem loans, IMF STAFF DIscussIoN NOTE
No. 15/19 (2015); K. Bergthaler & Y Liu, D Monaghan, Tackling small and medium sized
enterprise problem loans in Europe, IMF STAFF DiscussIoN NOTE No. 15/04, (2015); R.
Espinoza & A Prasad, Nonperforming loans in the GCC banking system and their macroeconomic
effects, IMF WORKING PAPER No. 10/244 (2015); N. Klein, Non-performing loans in CESEE:
Determinants and impact on macroeconomic performance, IMF WORKING PAPER (2013).
109. For alternative policy solutions, see Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart, "An Anatomy of
Bank Bail-ins - Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal Backstop for the Banking Sector", (2016/2)
EUROPEAN ECONOMY - BANKs, REGULATION, AND THE REAL SECTOR (www.european-
economy.eu) 65-79.
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On September 12, 2012, the Commission proposed a single supervisory
mechanism for Eurozone banks, run by the ECB, in order to strengthen the
EMU. The SSM is the first step towards an integrated "banking union,"
which includes further components such as a single rulebook, common
deposit protection and single bank resolution mechanisms.
The desirable ambit of the ECB's supervisory powers has been the subject
of considerable debate. Several Member States have wanted the SSM to be
restricted to "systemically important" banks. For example, there is a
controversy about whether German savings and cooperative banks should
come under the remit of the SSM, as these banks consider themselves as
local regional banks with passive assets and low risk exposures, and hence,
subject to different policy regime from commercial banks. But small or
medium-sized banks can also endanger the stability of the EU financial
system as well, e.g., the failures of banks like Northern Rock or the Spanish
Caixas. Thus, a single supervisory mechanism is probably a more effective
option. Furthermore, the existence of two supervisory mechanisms for
banks, operating in the same market, would inevitably create conflicts of
jurisdiction and competence (turf wars) undermining the banking union.
Eventually, the ECB would focus its direct supervision only on those banks,
which can generate significant prudential risks through their size or risk
profile.
There is a legitimate concern that adding supervision-a politically
charged task-to the ECB's responsibilities may compromise its impartiality
and independence. Therefore, the supervisory function needs to be kept
discrete and independent from the rest of the ECB structures to preserve its
institutional autonomy. This is a very important distinction because banking
and monetary policy, though inter-linked, are not identical. But there are
contrasting views with regards to the extent and form of separation between
the two functions.n1o This concern is less theoretical than it sounds and in
many corners of the euro-area banking sector voices are raised about the
deleterious effect that QE and very low interest rates have an bank
profitability and overall financial health."'
2. The Scope of SSM Powers
Under the SSM Regulation of October 2013, the ECB is vested with the
necessary investigatory and supervisory powers to perform its tasks and will
carry out the following functions:
Licensing/authorization of EMU based financial institutions (in
cooperation with the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) (Arts 4
&14 of the SSM Regulation);
110. Thorsten Beck & Daniel Gros, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination
instead of Separation, Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2013-003, (Mar. 2013).
111. David Folkerts-Landau, The ECB must change course, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, June 8,
2016.
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Monitoring compliance with capital, leverage and liquidity
requirements (Arts 4 & 16 of the SSM Regulation);
Conducting supervision of financial conglomerates (Art. 4(1)(h) and
Rec. 26);
Early intervention measures (Prompt Corrective Action) when a bank
breaches or risks breaching regulatory capital requirements by requiring
banks to take remedial action (Art. 4(1)(i) and Rec. 27).112
The ECB is directly responsible only for the authorization and
supervision of "significant" institutions, a term that encompasses individual
entities, significant groups, and holding companies. The SSM Regulation
and the SSM Framework Regulation contain several criteria according to
which credit institutions are classified as either significant or less significant.
Accordingly, significance is assessed based on the following criteria: "(a) size;
(b) importance for the economy of the Union or of any participating
Member State; (c) significance of cross-border activities."113 A credit
institution, financial holding company, or mixed financial holding company
shall not be considered less significant, unless justified by particular
circumstances, if any of the following conditions are met:
(a) the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion;
(b) the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating
Member State of establishment exceeds 20 [percent], unless the total
value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion;
(c) the total value of its assets exceeds C5 billion and the ratio of its
cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating
Member State to its total assets/liabilities is above 20 [percent].
(d) it is one of the three most significant credit institutions established
in a Member State;
(e) it is a recipient of direct assistance from the European Stability
Mechanism.i4
Following a notification by a national competent authority that it
considers such an institution of significant relevance with regard to the
domestic economy, the ECB makes a decision confirming such significance
following a comprehensive assessment, including a balance-sheet assessment
of that credit institution. Notwithstanding the fulfillment of the above
criteria, the ECB may also, on its own initiative, consider an institution to be
of significant relevance where it has established banking subsidiaries in more
than one participating Member State and its cross-border assets or liabilities
112. Council Regulation 1024/2013, art. 4, 2013 OJ. (L 287) 74 (EU).
113. Id. art. 6, at 75.
114. Id.
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represent a significant part of its total assets or liabilities subject to the
conditions laid down in the methodology.1"
Determination of whether or not a credit institution is significant is made
on an on-going basis and the SSM conducts a regular review: all credit
institutions authorized within the participating Member States are assessed
to determine whether they fulfill the criteria for significance. If a group or a
credit institution that is considered less significant meets any of the relevant
criteria for the first time, it is declared significant and the NCA hands over
responsibility for its direct supervision to the ECB. Conversely, a credit
institution may no longer be significant, in which case, the supervisory
responsibility for it returns to the relevant NCA(s). In both cases, the ECB
and the NCA(s) involved carefully review and discuss the issue and, unless
particular circumstances exist, plan and implement the transfer of
supervisory responsibilities so as to allow for a continued and effective
supervision.116
The ECB has exclusive competence to grant and withdraw the
authorization of any credit institution,"1 acting as the home regulator for
firms from the Eurozone who use the EU passport to carry out cross-border
business or establish a branch in a non-Eurozone Member State,"' and to
assess the acquisition of holdings in credit institutions in the euro area.119
The ECB's Authorization Division carries out these tasks.120
Notwithstanding the ECB's exclusive competence in carrying out these tasks
the ECB acts jointly with the National Competent Authorities (NCAs).
Both the ECB and the NCAs of participating Member States, where an
institution is established, have the right to propose the withdrawal of a
banking license. NCAs can propose a withdrawal upon the request of the
credit institution concerned or, in other cases, on its own initiative in
accordance with national legislation.121 The ECB can initiate a withdrawal
in cases set out in the relevant EU laws.122 Either way, the final decision
rests with the ECB.123 The institution concerned has the right to be heard
under Article 31 of the SSM Framework Regulation. The ECB Guide to
Banking Supervision provides that the ECB and the relevant NCAs consult on
any proposals for the withdrawal of a license.124
Critically, given the fact that such withdrawal, if not voluntary, will
inevitably relate to a bank entering resolution due to failing to meet the
115. Id.
116. Id. at 75, 77.
117. Council Regulation 1024/2013, art. 4, 2013 OJ. (L 287) 74, 80 (EU).
118. Id. at 74.
119. Council Regulation 575/2013, arts. 4, 15, 2013 OJ. (L 176) 18, 31 (EU).
120. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, GUIDE TO BANKING SUPERVISION 27 (2014), https://www
.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision201411 .en.pdfP404fd6
cb61dbde0095c8722d5aff29cd.
121. Id. art. 80, at 37.
122. Id. art. 82, at 38.
123. Id. arts. 81,83.
124. Id. at 29 n.121.
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capital and liquidity thresholds provided in the CRD TV, these consultations,
according to the ECB Guide, are also used to lawfully buy time, as they "are
intended to ensure that, before a decision is taken, the relevant bodies (i.e.
NCAs, national resolution authorities and the ECB) have sufficient time to
analyze and comment on the proposal, raise potential objections and take the
necessary steps and decisions to preserve the going concern or resolve the
institution, if deemed appropriate."125
B. THE NEW EU RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
By providing common mechanisms to resolve banks, the Eurozone has
established, by means of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (SRM Regulation), a
single resolution mechanism (SRM), which would govern the resolution of
banks in the Eurozone and coordinate the application of resolution tools to
banks. The resolution mechanism is aimed at safeguarding the continuity of
essential banking operations, to protect depositors, client assets, and public
funds, and to minimize risks to financial stability. This mechanism would be
more efficient than a network of national resolution authorities particularly
in the case of cross-border failures, given the need for speed and credibility
in addressing the issues in the midst of a crisis. The core body within the
SRM is the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which is the resolution authority
within the Banking Union. Together, with the National Resolution
Authorities (NRAs), it forms the SRM. The Single Resolution Board (SRB)
has been operational as an independent European Union (EU) Agency since
January 2015. The mission of the SRB is to ensure an orderly resolution of
failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and the public
finances of the participating Member States of the Banking Union.
The decisions have to be taken in line with the principles of resolution as
set out in the single resolution rulebook comprising the EU Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and associated legislation.126 The main
resolution tools, as detailed in the BRRD (Art. 37) are the following:
(1) the sale of business tool whereby the authorities would sell all or
part of the failing bank to another bank, without the consent of
shareholders (Art. 38-38 BRRD);
(2) the bridge bank tool, which consists of identifying the good assets
or essential functions of the bank and separates them into a new bank
(bridge bank) (Art. 40-41 BRRD). The bridge bank will later be sold to
another entity, in order to preserve these essential banking functions or
facilitate the continuous access to deposits. The old bank with the bad
or non-essential functions would then be liquidated under normal
insolvency proceedings;
125. Id.
126. Council Directive 2014/59, 2014 OJ. (L 173) 190-348 (EU).
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(3) the asset separation tool, whereby the bad assets of the bank are put
into an asset management vehicle (Arts 37(3), 42 BRRD). This tool
relieves the balance sheet of a bank from bad or 'toxic' assets. In order
to prevent this tool from being used solely as a state aid measure, the
framework prescribes that it may be used only in conjunction with
another tool (bridge bank, sale of business or write-down). This
ensures that while the bank receives support, it also undergoes
restructuring; and,
(4) the bail-in tool, whereby the bank would be recapitalized with
shareholders wiped out or diluted, and creditors would have their claims
reduced or converted to shares (Section 5 BRRD).127
Therefore, an institution for which a private buyer cannot be found, or
which cannot split up without destroying franchise value and other intra-
firm synergies, could thus continue to provide essential services without the
need for a bail-out by public funds, and authorities would have time to
reorganize it or wind down parts of its business in an orderly manner. To
this end, banks would be required to have a minimum percentage of their
total liabilities eligible for bail-in Art. 48 BRRD).128 If triggered, they would
be written down in a pre-defined order in terms of seniority of claims in
order for the institution to regain viability (Art. 46 BRRD).129 The choice of
tools will depend on the specific circumstances of each case and build on
options laid out in the resolution plan prepared for the bank.
A bank would become subject to resolution when:130 (a) the institution is
failing or is likely to fail having breached objective capital and liquidity
indicators,'3' (b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances,
there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures,
or supervisory action, including early intervention measures or the write
127. Id. art. 37.
128. Id. art. 48.
129. Id. art. 46.
130. Id. art. 32.
131. "[An institution shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail in one or more of the
following circumstances: (a) the institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a
determination that the institution will, in the near future, infringe the requirements for
continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the
competent authority including but not limited to because the institution has incurred or is likely
to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds; (b) the assets of the
institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the
institution will, in the near future, be less than its liabilities; (c) the institution is or there are
objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near future, be
unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due; (d) extraordinary public financial
support is required except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a
Member State and preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes
any of the following forms: (i) a State guarantee to bank liquidity facilities provided by central
banks according to the central banks' conditions; (ii) a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities;
or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms that
do not confer an advantage upon the institution." Id.
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down or conversion of relevant capital instruments would prevent the failure
of the institution within a reasonable timeframe, (c) a resolution action is
necessary in the public interest and to achieve the resolution objectives of
financial stability, protection of public money and depositors' money and
continuous provision of critical services.132 As explained above, it is deemed
that entry into resolution will always occur at a point close to insolvency.
C. THE NEw DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEME
The European Union started the process of harmonization of DGSs in
1994 with the EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes.133 According
to the Commission, the minimum harmonization approach of the 1994
Directive resulted in significant differences among DGSs as to the level of
coverage, the scope of covered depositors, and products and the payout
delay. Prior to Autumn 2008, when the financial crisis hit, the mechanics of
the financing of schemes was left entirely to Member States. This turned
out to be disruptive for financial stability and the proper functioning of the
internal market. The DGS Directive was significantly amended following
the failure of Lehman Brothers,134 and in 2010, the Commission proposed a
comprehensive reform of DGS in the European Union. The harmonization
process was primarily guided by the principle of creating a level playing field
with a focus on coverage limits and preference for ex ante funding. It was
rightly thought that without common rules and consistent protection for
consumers, the single market for deposits cannot operate effectively. The
Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crisis subsequently became the
catalyst, as countries which seemed to be in trouble-especially Greece, but
also Italy and Spain-experienced a deposit drain.35 Accordingly, a pan-
European deposit guarantee scheme implemented via a redrawn DGS
directive36 was mooted as the third pillar of the European Banking Union.137
Yet, it has been the pillar that Member States have found the most difficult
to agree on, as doing so would essentially lead to mutualization of bank debt
in the Eurozone.
132. Council Directive 2014/59, supra note 126, art. 31, at 248.
133. Directive 94/19, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5.
134. Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Mar. 2009
amending Directive 94/19/EC as regards the coverage level and the payout delay, 2009 OJ. (L
68) 3. The Directive of March 2009 required Member States to increase coverage of their DGS
- first, to at least 50,000, and then, to a uniform level of 100,000 by the end of 2010.
135. See, e.g., Christopher Bjork, Bankia Plummets on Deposit Drain Concerns, MARKETWATCH
.COM (last updated May 17, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bankia-
plummets-on-deposit-drain-concerns-2012-05-17-8720.
136. European Commission Memoranda, MEMO/12/656, Towards a Banking Union (Sept.
10, 2012). "This would be the first step towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme." Id.
137. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Roadmap
Towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final (Sept. 9, 2012). "This would be the first step
towards a pan-EU deposit guarantee scheme." Id.
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The widespread consultation culminated in the 2014 EU DGS
Directive,138 which had a very short implementation period up to July 2015.
Proposals for a pan-European deposit insurance scheme were not adopted,
but the Commission has pushed for theml39 and German opposition
continues.140 Thus, deposit protection continues to be provided by national
DGSs, which extend coverage nationally to both financial institutions and
their EU-based foreign branches.141 For example, under the 2015 Treasury
Regulation, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Compensation
Scheme (FSCS) covers both United Kingdom regulated banks, building
societies, and credit unions and their branches in other Member States.142
Harmonization of coverage levels under the 2014 DGS Directive is
limited to statutory DGSs. Outside the scope of the Directive are Member
State protection schemes in Member States (e.g., on a voluntary or
contractual basis) that offer additional deposit protection (except for some
requirements on the information that needs to be given to depositors about
the actual protection offered to them under the alternative scheme). The
protection limit for deposits remains at C100,000 or its local currency
equivalent.143 The Directive imposes a standard of a seven (working) day
pay-out following a transition period,144 and has a generous implementation
lead-time of nine years. Under the 2014 Directive, deposit protection is
now extended to trade transactions, as it covers "temporary high
balances."15 For consumers, this means they will have some additional
protection for exceptional and short-lived deposits resulting from major life
events, like the sale of a home. The Directive extends DGS to all businesses
and not just SMEs, as was previously the case.146
The 2014 Directive imposes a minimum target funding level of 0.8
percent of covered deposits; Member States, however, can set a higher target
level for their DGS.147 Currently, schemes in about half of Member States
138. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Apr. 2014 on
Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 2014 O.J. (L 173/149).
139. Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, at 20 (June 22, 2015), https://ec.europa
.eu/priorities/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-moneta
ry-union en.
140. Gernot Heller, Germany Opposes EU Plan for Common Deposit Guarantees - Document,
REUTERS.COM (Sept. 11, 2015, 11:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/eu-
deposits-germany-idUSL5N1 H2WY20150911.
141. Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 133, art.
14(1).
142. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme Regulations 2015, SI 2015/486, art. 3 (UK).
143. Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 133, art. 6,
recs. 21, 23.
144. Id. art. 8.
145. Id. art. 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. 10(2). The level of coverage is a costly and thus contentious issue. For this reason
the Directive provides that 5 years after its entry into force, the Commission, supported by the
European Banking Authority (EBA) will submit to the European Parliament and to the Council
a report on, inter alia, the target level on the basis of covered deposits, with an assessment of the
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have already reached the above target level or are relatively close to it. In
one-third of Member States, DGS funds are above 1 percent of covered
deposits, and in a few of them, they are even beyond 2 percent or 3
percent.48 Nonetheless, the Directive stipulates that Member States, upon
approval of the Commission, may set a target level lower than the above, but
not lower than 0.5 percent of covered deposits.149
In principle, the composition of funds available to the DGS should
include cash, deposits, and low-risk assets, which can be liquidated within a
short period of time.i5o But, DGS funds may also consist of so-called
"payment commitments.", 5 Payment commitments are commitments of a
bank towards a DGS, which are fully collateralized, provided that the
collateral consists of low risk assets, and the collateral is unencumbered by
third party rights.152 The total share of payment commitments shall not
exceed 30 percent of the total amount of available financial means of the
DGS.53 In order to ensure consistent application of the Directive in
Member States, the European Banking Authority will issue guidelines on the
irrevocable payment commitments. Moreover, in order to fulfill their
obligations of reaching the required target funding level, Member States
may regard bank levies as equivalent to ex ante funds.'15 The available
financial means of DGS must be invested in a low-risk and sufficiently
diversified manner.
Funding arrangements will also change under the new scheme. For
example, levies on the industry to fund deposit protection will be "risk-
based," meaning that firms' liability to meet levies will no longer be based
solely on their share of deposits, but will take account of the risk they pose to
the deposit insurer.55 The risk-based approach has been adopted in order to
counter moral hazard; namely, in order to provide banks incentives to
operate "under a less risky business model."i56 Risk will be measured on the
basis of a mix of obligatory indicators developed by the European Banking
Authority (75 percent weight) and other indicators developed by the DGS
and the national authorities (25 percent weight).57 In addition,
appropriateness of the percentage set, taking into account the failure of EU banks in the past.
Id. Rec. 23.
148. European Commission Memo MEMO/14/296, Deposit Guarantee Schemes - Frequently
Asked Questions (Apr. 15, 2014).
149. Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 133, art.
10(6).
150. Id. art. 2(1), (12).
151. Id. art. 10(3).
152. Id. art. 2(1), (13), (14).
153. Id. art. 10(3).
154. Id. art. 10(1).
155. Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 133, art. 13,
rec. 36.
156. Id. rec. 36.
157. European Banking Authority [EBA], Guidelines on Payment Commitment Under Directive
2014/49 EU on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, EBA/GL/2015/09 (May 28, 2015), https://www
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contributions will have a counter-cyclical element.18 This provision makes
very good sense, as it adjusts bank contributions to the macroeconomic cycle
and requisite fluctuations of bank profitability.
Finally, the 2014 Directive allows national DGSs to voluntarily borrow
funds from each other in the event that they face a shortfall,159 provided that
the total amount lent does not exceed 0.5 percent of covered deposits of the
borrowing DGS. But the borrowing DGS must repay the loan within five
years, and the contributions levied by the borrowing DGS must be sufficient
to reimburse the amount borrowed and to reestablish the target level as soon
as possible.160
D. EVALUATION OF EU REGULATORY REFORMS
Centralization of bank supervision and resolution within a single currency
zone is an essential condition for a functional monetary union, but it is no
panacea. The continuing NPL crisis in the Eurozone periphery as well as
concerns about the financial health of Deutsche Bank are a very strong
argument in favor of this view. The EU crisis management and resolution
framework does not contain a fiscal backstop, as the ESM was not, as
originally envisaged, as it turned into a direct bank recapitalization tool. On
the contrary, the job of breaking up of the doom loop has been entrusted to
the creation of a minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities
to be bailed-in and the mandatory use of creditor bail-ins up to an 8 percent
minimum of total liabilities and own funds to cover bank losses.161 At the
heart of these loopholes is the Treaty prohibition of fiscal transfers in the
Eurozone and fears that a fiscal union in the Eurozone will undermine fiscal
discipline.162
A number of coordination challenges remain within the SSM. The ECB,
together with the Central Banks of the EU Member States (NCBs),
comprises the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Because of the
dual roles the NCBs play, this configuration produces ignificant structural
complexity.163 The NCBs, on the one hand, are national agencies that
perform non-ESCB functions; and on the other, the NCBs constitute an
important part of the ESCB helping to shape the conduct of EMU monetary
policy. Moreover, this functional complexity is rooted deeper still in their
.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1089310/EBA-GL-2015-09+Guidelines+on+DGS+payment+
commitments.pdf.
158. Parliament and Council Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, supra note 133, art.
10(2), rec. 34.
159. Id. art 12(1).
160. Id. art 12(3).
161. Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit
institutions and investment firms, supra note 126, art. 37(10)(a).
162. Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It Work? And Are
There Really 'No Alternatives'?, FORSCHUNGSINTITUT ZUR ZUKUNFT DER ARBEIT, Policy
Paper No. 39 (Mar. 2012).
163. Rosa M. Lastra & Jean Victor Louis, supra note 13.
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constitutive laws. Whereas, the ECB operates solely under the EC law while
the status of the NCBs is governed by both the EC law and national
legislation.
Moreover, in spite of the existence of common rulebooks, tensions
between the EBU bodies and non EBU European supervisors may not be
ruled out, especially when it comes to early intervention measures
concerning branches. In spite of the existence of EU-wide supervision
colleges, the lack of complete centralization in terms of supervision creates
the same conflicting incentives between home and host (and room for
regulatory forbearance) as in any other context. In response to this concern,
non-EBU EU members increasingly move toward further de facto
localization/subsidiarization, negating the spirit of the EU single-market
project.
On the other hand, developments urrounding the result of the United
Kingdom's EU Referendum of June 2016 may reverse this trend, especially
if United Kingdom negotiators do not safeguard the passport for the
country's financial services firms. In that case, while the United Kingdom
may proceed on the basis of equivalence provisions to obliterate the
prudential carve out offered in GATS,164 the rest of the EU regulatory
regimes remaining outside the EBU will probably subject themselves to the
"suzerainty" of the larger jurisdiction (the EBU), leading to a possible
reversal of subsidiarization.
VI. Conclusion: Fragmentation or a More Complete Union?
The reform of the EU integration mechanisms in the aftermath of the
GFC and in the context of the Eurozone debt crisis marks an important
milestone in the integration process and regionalism drive, especially
because it has exposed the failure of various institutional mechanisms
supposed to ensure financial market stability. The EU crisis response bears
significant implications in the development and functioning of single market
operations and has emphasized the need to improve international and
regional coordination on fiscal, monetary and financial policies affecting
other states.
Over a period of several decades, the progressive development of an
integrated, single financial market in the EU, combined with a single
currency among most of its members, led to the imbalances that became
164. The prudential carve-out gives national governments freedom to regulate the financial
sector for prudential reasons, notwithstanding any commitments made under the General
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS). See XXXVII. Annex on Financial Services, art.
A.2.(a). For recent case law about the ambit of the carve out, see Argentina Measures Relating to
Trade in Goods and Services, Dispute DS453 (May 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-e/cases-e/ds453_e. htm.
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visible when the GFC erupted in 2008.165 Unfortunately, despite the vast
amount of effort expended in developing both the EU single financial
market and EMU, important design features necessary to support financial
stability had not been put in place or were not sufficiently robust,
particularly in relation to resolution of cross-border financial institutions,
deposit guarantee arrangements, regulation and supervision and fiscal
arrangements and affairs.
Arguably, the financial stability risks are magnified within integrated
cross-border markets, especially contagion risks. Thus, it is not
controversial, even though it does challenge orthodox thinking, to argue that
financial integration is not always beneficial. Despite the increased
importance of enhanced regionalism and integration, policy formulation
must take a balanced view. The European crisis provides a deep insight to
the risks of integration and identifies mistakes not to be repeated in the
adoption of integration plans elsewhere, chiefly in the context of East Asia.
This balanced view of integration offers further perspectives. First, the
soundness and credibility of domestic policies are not substitutes for regional
commitments, even though, at times when domestic policies are "stuck,"
regional commitments can help to "tie hands" and exert external pressure.
Second, rather than imposition of strict benchmarks and milestones to meet
the idiosyncrasies of individual economies, the integration framework should
facilitate and encourage the growth of regional economies while allowing
the market to work freely. Third, it does not matter how much integration
or liberalization has been achieved in the region. What matters is that
regional approaches and small steps of cooperation result in increased
integration which can bring more growth, development and stability, while
lowering associated contagion-driven risks.
Risks flowing from cross-border financial crises tend to intensify within
integrated markets. The more integrated a regional market, the higher the
propensity for cross-border contagion. The cascading effects of the on-
going Eurozone crisis are a vivid reminder of the contagion risk in a highly
integrated system.166 The EU crisis is a powerful reassertion of the same
reality that reflects on the vulnerability of economically integrated markets
in times of crisis when national responses prove insufficient to deal with the
common issues in an economically integrated area.
The Eurozone debt crisis has clearly exposed the weaknesses of regulatory
structures divided along national lines when these have to deal with
integrated cross-border financial markets. It has also highlighted the limited
range of policy choices available from within the EU/EMU system as it
existed prior to 2008. As a result, the EU faces a number of hard choices
extending to the intractable trade-offs between national sovereignty and
165. Jiirgen Stark, Crisis and Recovery in Emerging Europe: The Policy Response in Retrospect and
Challenges Ahead, in FROM CRISIS To RECOVERY: OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES IN EMERGING
EUROPE 13, (Thierry Bracke & Reiner Martin eds., Palgrave MacMillan 2012).
166. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN ECON. INTEGRATION MONITOR (July 2012), http://
www.aric.adb.org/pdf/aeim/AEIM 2012JulyFullReport.pdf.
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collective financial stability. The establishment of a European banking union
within the boundaries of the Eurozone, which includes a single supervisor, a
single resolution authority and, in the future, a pan-European deposit
guarantee scheme, have clearly tilted the balance towards further
centralization and pooling of sovereignty. This development, however,
highlights the level of sovereignty concessions that are necessary to support
an effective single market, and even more so when the single market is
underpinned by currency arrangements. In that case, a fiscal union to
smooth out trade imbalances and to contain shocks in the financial sector
seems inevitable.167 This level of sacrifice, though, is beyond the capacity of
most national polities. This has been clearly demonstrated by Brexit,
highlighting the very probable sui generis situation of Continental Western
Europe in the process of full economic, monetary, and financial integration.
From the EU regulatory reforms discussed above, three initiatives stand
out. First, centralization of supervision for Eurozone banks through the
SSM means that the ECB is now the prudential supervisor of the Eurozone
banking sector.168 Second, EU plans for the harmonization of Member State
resolution laws and introduction of integrated resolution structures are in
the process of implementation. Third, the development of common EU
rulebooks for the single market by the European Supervisory Authorities is
proceeding rapidly. Another area of particular importance is the adoption
by the EU, through the European Banking Union and the common
resolution framework, of measures, which aim at breaking the link between
bank rescues and public money/indebtedness.
EU Member States have set up, in the course of the last sixty years,
institutions in order to manage the challenges of a multi-faceted integration
process and provide acceptable structures for political and democratic
accountability. EU institutions have also been used by the Union in order to
accumulate knowledge and expertise that may be useful in responding to
new challenges. But we should be careful in arguing that the EU institution-
building experience, or for that matter the EU integration process, given the
specific characteristics of internal market, can be used as the only reform
template, although they can indeed provide model lessons to the rest of the
world.
In past decades, the importance of institutions dealing with financial
markets has mostly been ignored, probably because economists thought of
them as an unnecessary cost imposed on efficient and self-correcting
markets. So, the EU experience is invaluable in supplying policy-makers
167. AGNS BSNASSY-QUSRS ET AL., Which Fiscal Union for the Euro Area? (Bruegel Policy
Contribution ed., 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/02/which-fiscal-union-for-the-euro-area/.
168. It should also be noted that the ECB had never had a 'treaty-based' mandate to act as
shock-absorber in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. Absence of this mandate will continue
to represent a missing link in the EU reform process. Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas Arner, The
Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European Banking Union 45, n. 140 (University of Edinburgh, Oct.
2013), http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-eurozone-debt-crisis-and-the-
european-banking-union(26638640-17eb-4a02-99f6-dccefl25f49e).html.
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with irrefutable evidence about the axiom that, although financial markets
may be established anywhere (provided that certain property rights are
recognized by local law), in the absence of restrictions on cross-border flows,
their stability may only be guaranteed through appropriate institutions, and
not by reliance on market forces' rationality and coordination. Therefore,
arrangements to safeguard the stability of the cross-border market cannot be
delayed until formal integration efforts reach a peak, whether in the form of
establishment of a single currency area, or otherwise.
The complexities involved in harmonizing common practices, standards
and specifically the legal rules for such diverse economies, mean that
European Banking Union-type institutions are not feasible in the foreseeable
future. Yet, this does not mean that the leadership of those countries hould
not think about the challenges to financial stability created by increasing
market integration and financial interconnectedness in the region. It only
means that, for the time being, other less strong integrative measures, such
as subsidiarization, are probably more suitable and effective in other contexts
than the EU's plans for centralization of cross-border bank supervision and
resolution. In addition, while establishment of a single regulator with power
to intervene and discipline banks is probably not feasible in other regions,
building a macro-supervisory umbrella is essential. In such a case, the
function of macro-prudential oversight ought to be discharged by an
independent body in order to secure credibility and authority, even if it is a
soft law body.
Arguably, in an increasingly globalized world, formal international
cooperation in the field of financial stability and cross-border bank
supervision and resolution, might in the long run come to be seen as a
necessary ingredient of national prosperity in an environment where
national financial markets are closely integrated.169 This would especially be
the case if on-going national and regional reforms prove to be less successful
than expected. Building multilevel financial governance in a region as
economically and politically integrated as the EU is infinitely less
complicated than a similar attempt at the global scale. The same might
apply to replication of EU plans in other regions. Of course, these may in
the end serve more as challenges to be overcome rather than insurmountable
stumbling blocks. Either way, policy-makers should not assume that they
have ample time to deliberate before another major crisis breaks out. They
should urgently start with the business of augmenting global and regional
financial stability mechanisms in order to safeguard future economic
prosperity.
169. For an example of such a model for the governance of global financial markets, see
EMILlos AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW, THE
ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS, 213-58, 429-59 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
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